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After the Feeney Amendment
The federal sentencing guidelines are designed to
encourage defendants to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities. “Cooperation,” in this context, means not only
providing assistance in the apprehension and prosecution
of other criminal offenders, but also such other desirable
actions as pleading guilty before trial. The guidelines
induce cooperation through a variety of authorized
adjustments and departures, including provisions
rewarding substantial assistance and acceptance
of responsibility, and penalizing obstruction of justice.1
Neglected amidst other controversial provisions,
Congress through the Feeney Amendment accomplished
the most important restructuring of cooperation
inducements in the federal system since the guidelines’
promulgation. In particular, Congress legitimized and
attempted to impose new controls over locally-initiated
early disposition programs, while shifting some judicial
power over the acceptance of responsibility adjustment to
prosecutors.
In this Article, I describe the guidelines’ system for
inducing cooperation before and after Feeney. I also offer
a preliminary evaluation of the changes Feeney has
wrought, including the policy decisions made by the
Sentencing Commission and the Attorney General for
purposes of implementing the new early disposition
departure.
I focus here, in particular, on problems of public
accountability. Pre-Feeney, the cooperation inducement
regime left considerable discretion in the hands of
sentencing judges, United States Attorneys, and line
prosecutors, resulting in much district-to-district
variation in sentencing practices. Localized decision-
making, in and of itself, may not necessarily be a bad
thing – indeed, I believe it is affirmatively desirable –
but localization was accomplished pre-Feeney with little
public explanation or review. The lack of accountability
gave rise to charges that the cooperation inducements
were being used disingenuously to undermine the efforts
of Congress and the Commission to increase sentence
lengths. The Feeney Amendment seems to address some
of these accountability concerns through the new early
disposition departure. At the same time, the increasingly
preeminent role of prosecutors raises new accountability
concerns in its own right.
I. Cooperation Before Feeney
A. Relevant Guidelines
The guidelines encourage cooperation primarily through
the substantial assistance and acceptance of
responsibility provisions. Under § 5K1.1, the sentencing
judge may depart downward “upon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investigation and
prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense.” The various United States Attorneys’ Offices
(“USAOs”) have interpreted and applied the provision
differently. They disagree, for instance, over whether a
defendant may earn a substantial assistance motion
merely by providing information as to his or her own
criminal activity.2 In some districts, substantial
assistance departures have become routine, while in
others they are rare.3
Under § 3E1.1, the sentencing judge may reduce a
defendant’s offense level by two points if the defendant
“clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense.” This provision grew out of the Commission’s
desire to provide an incentive for defendants to plead
guilty,4 and, in many districts, judges seem to award an
acceptance adjustment on a nearly automatic basis to
defendants who do so.5
In 1992, the Commission amended § 3E1.1 to allow
judges to reduce the defendant’s offense level by a third
point if the defendant’s offense level is 16 or greater
(before applying any acceptance adjustment) and the
defendant “assist[s] authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct.” A defendant might
satisfy the latter requirement either by (1) “timely
providing complete information to the government
concerning his own involvement in the offense” or (2)
“timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a
plea of guilty.” The amendment was intended to provide
defendants with a greater incentive to plead guilty than
had been available when judges could only award a
two-point discount.6
While the substantial assistance and acceptance
provisions are the most frequently invoked, other
sections of the guidelines also encourage cooperation,
such as the penalties for obstruction of justice and
reckless endangerment during flight from a law
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enforcement officer.7 I have argued elsewhere that the
Commission ought to rethink the relationship among the
disparate cooperation-inducing provisions, with an eye to
addressing various inconsistencies and redundancies.8
B. Cooperation Inducements Outside the Guidelines
While the guidelines offer cooperation inducements,
many prosecutors found the guidelines regime too rigid
or parsimonious, and resorted to other mechanisms to
induce cooperation. Thus, for instance, various southwest
border districts adopted early disposition, or “fast-track,”
programs; under these programs, prosecutors would
agree to support non-substantial-assistance departures as
an inducement to very quick pleas on standardized
terms.9 In other districts, prosecutors would
charge-bargain in order to induce early pleas.10
Prosecutors felt that the special plea inducements were
necessary, in particular, to process a growing tide of
immigration cases. Thus, for instance, the fast-track
program in the Southern District of California facilitated
a six-fold increase in annual prosecutions of criminal
alien cases between 1994 and 2001.11
Yet, the fast-track programs were of questionable
validity, particularly insofar as they required prosecutors
to make departure motions or support other sentencing
benefits not clearly justified by the law or the facts.12
Moreover, they at least arguably contravened the spirit of
the guidelines, which explicitly provided for acceptance
and substantial assistance as the approved means of
inducing cooperation.
Although the legal authority for some fast-track
programs was uncertain pre-Feeney, they existed in as
many as half of the nation’s judicial districts.13 However,
because fast-track benefits were not required to be
reported as such to the Commission, their magnitude
and frequency were not precisely known.
II. Cooperation After Feeney
A. Statutory Changes
With respect to cooperation, the Feeney Amendment’s
most notable contribution is the creation of a new
four-level “downward departure” for defendants who
plead guilty pursuant to an authorized early disposition
program.14 The early disposition departure seems to fill
an important gap in the guidelines by providing an
explicit, incremental incentive for defendants who plead
even earlier, and under conditions even more favorable
to the government, than is required for an acceptance
adjustment.
While early disposition programs are not new, Feeney
nonetheless marks a watershed in their development. In
part, this is because early departure programs have now
been legally legitimized, and might thus spread to new
districts or take on new forms. But, at the same time, the
Feeney Amendment also brings early disposition
programs under greater central control: Congress has
limited the sentencing discount to four levels, and early
disposition programs now require the Attorney General’s
authorization. Such restrictions may offset the
legitimization effects, and perhaps lead to a contraction
in the number of early disposition programs.
In addition to establishing the new early disposition
departure, the Feeney Amendment also modifies § 3E1.1
by requiring a prosecutor’s motion before the sentencing
court can award the third level of the adjustment.15 The
change has been made, according to the new law,
“[b]ecause the Government is in the best position to
determine whether the defendant has assisted authorities
in a manner that avoids preparing for trial.”16
Additionally, in order to qualify for the third-level
reduction, the defendant must now timely notify the
government of his or her intention to plead guilty. The
Feeney Amendment strikes previous language that
allowed a three-level reduction merely for timely
providing information to the government, without
necessarily entering a timely plea.17 Thus, at the same
time that greater control over acceptance has been shifted
to the prosecutor, the grounds for receiving an extra
one-level reduction based on acceptance of responsibility
have been narrowed.
The Feeney Amendment leaves substantial assistance
and other cooperation provisions largely untouched.18
B. Implementation of the Fast-Track Provision
1. Guideline Amendment
In order to implement the provision in the Feeney
Amendment authorizing an official “fast-track”
departure, the Commission promulgated new § 5K3.1,
which largely tracks the statutory language in
authorizing a downward departure of not more than four
levels. Departure requires a motion from the government
made pursuant to an authorized early disposition
program. The Commission provided no additional
guidance for the new departure. For instance, while the
Commission suggested that the sentencing court will
have discretion in deciding whether to grant a departure
(“the court may depart”), the Commission did not
provide a standard to govern this exercise of discretion.
Nor did the Commission suggest any circumstances in
which the court might appropriately deny a government
motion. Likewise, other than capping the departure at
four levels, the Commission did not offer any guidance
as to the proper scope of departure.
2. Attorney General Memorandum
The Attorney General offered his own set of
implementation principles for “fast-track” departures in
his memorandum to all U.S. Attorneys dated September
22, 2003 (the “Fast Track Memo”).19 Pursuant to the
Memo, in order to obtain authorization to operate an
early disposition program, a U.S. Attorney’s Office
(USAO) must demonstrate that:
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(A) (1) the district confronts an exceptionally large
number of a specific class of offenses within the
district, and failure to handle such cases on an
expedited of “fast-track” basis would significantly
strain prosecutorial and judicial resources available in
the district; or (2) the district confronts some other
exceptional local circumstance with respect to a
specific class of cases that justifies expedited
disposition of such cases;
(B) declination of such cases in favor of state
prosecution is either unavailable or clearly
unwarranted;
(C) the specific class of cases consists of ones that are
highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact
scenarios; and
(D) the cases do not involve an offense that has been
designated by the Attorney General as a “crime of
violence.”20
The Memo also identifies certain features that will be
required of all authorized early disposition programs. In
order to qualify for departure, for instance, the defendant
will have to plead guilty “within a reasonably prompt
period after the filing of federal charges.”21 Additionally,
the defendant must agree to a factual basis that
accurately reflects the offense conduct, and must also
waive Rule 12(b)(3) motions, appeals, and § 2255
challenges.22
Some matters are left to the discretion of the USAOs.
For instance, each qualifying USAO may determine the
magnitude of the departure (up to four levels), or choose
to leave the question to the sentencing judge.23
Alternatively, the USAO may employ charge-bargaining
in its fast-track program, so long as the resulting
sentence reductions are “commensurate with” the
authorized downward departure.24
III. Evaluation
In this Part, I offer a preliminary evaluation of the
Feeney Amendment reforms based on four overlapping
considerations: overall coherence of the cooperation
inducement regime, localization in federal sentencing,
accountability, and prosecutorial power.
A. Coherence
A coherent system of cooperation inducements should
provide graduated benefits along a spectrum of
cooperative behaviors, from the eve-of-trial change of
plea to assisting authorities in the apprehension of other
criminals. In some respects, the Feeney Amendment
does enhance coherence in this area. Most importantly,
the new early disposition departure fills an important gap
in the guidelines structure, providing incremental
benefits for defendants whose early guilty pleas far
exceed the minimal requirements for acceptance of
responsibility, but who are not able to provide substantial
assistance. The Feeney Amendment recognizes that not
all plea deals are created equal: by their timing, for
instance, or the scope of their waivers, some deals may
be much more beneficial to the government than others.
While this point was already recognized in the third level
of the acceptance adjustment, the incremental benefit
was limited to defendants with an offense level of at least
16 and was not, in any event, an especially large benefit.
The importance of the gap is perhaps best demonstrated
by the fact that as many as half of all districts had
developed fast-track programs prior to the Feeney
Amendment.
At the same time, the gap-filling benefits are subject
to several important constraints. The early-disposition
departure will not necessarily be available in all districts.
Where it is available, it will be limited to a designated
class of cases. The Attorney General’s minimum
requirements further diminish the flexibility of the
cooperation inducement. Meanwhile, the unguided
discretion of the sentencing court in awarding early
disposition departures may undermine the certainty
(and, hence, attractiveness) of the sentencing benefit for
defendants. In short, the early-disposition departure is
only a first step towards the sort of flexible, broadly
applicable adjustment that is needed for defendants who
go beyond mere acceptance of responsibility, but who do
not qualify for a departure based on substantial
assistance.
Indeed, in other respects, the Feeney Amendment
exacerbates incoherence. In particular, the Amendment
eliminates the timely provision of information as a basis
for awarding a third-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Sentencing benefits here (much as with
the early-disposition departure) thus turn principally on
the timing of a plea agreement. Yet, timely providing
information may carry much the same benefits in
reducing trial preparation as a timely plea, as well as
additional public benefits in some cases (e.g.,
exonerating innocent co-defendants, helping the
authorities to recover stolen goods or dangerous
contraband, giving the public information that might
help to prevent similar crimes in the future). The timely
provision of information seems an appropriate form of
cooperation to reward, even if not accompanied by a
timely plea (which may be due to dilatory or
unreasonable negotiation tactics by the prosecutor). The
elimination of this possibility – coupled with the new
requirement of a government motion for the third-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility – renders
§ 3E1.1 even more rigid and less helpful as a cooperation
inducement tool than it was before the Feeney
Amendment.
B. Localization
I have argued elsewhere that the Commission and the
federal appellate courts have placed unnecessary and
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inappropriate restrictions on local variation in
sentencing.25 Within certain bounds, sentencing
judges and USAOs should have the freedom to adapt
national sentencing norms to local needs and
preferences.26 Indeed, at the time that the Sentencing
Commission was created, Congress itself suggested
that local variation might appropriately be incorporated
into the guidelines regime. Congress expressly
required the Commission to consider the relevance of
“the community view of the gravity of the offense”
and “the current incidence of the offense in the
community.”27
While the Commission has not formally endorsed
local variation in sentencing, a considerable body of
evidence indicates that such variation has become
pervasive.28 Professors Frank Bowman and Michael
Heise, drawing on an analysis of drug sentencing
patterns over the last 10 years, suggest that, “in place of a
single uniform national sentencing system, the
guidelines have created a network of separate local and
regional systems,” in each of which the front-line
sentencing actors have established a distinct
“equilibrium” as to “the commonly occurring issues in
guidelines application.”29
In the absence of clear authorization or structure,
current patterns of local variation raise important
concerns. In particular, insofar as local variation arises
from plea-bargaining (and hence does not create the sort
of record that would be generated by an adversarial
process), such variation evades public scrutiny and
debate, as well as review by appellate courts and the
Sentencing Commission. Simply put, the benefits of
localization must be balanced with a need for
accountability.
The early disposition departure may be a step in the
right direction. With this provision, the Feeney
Amendment provides the clearest legal authorization yet
for tailoring local sentencing practices to local needs. Yet,
the Feeney Amendment also imposes a structure on, and
enhances accountability for, localization. Departures are
limited to four levels. Early disposition programs must be
authorized by the United States Attorney and the
Attorney General. This authorization process may draw
localization more into the open, where it can be better
scrutinized and commented on by the public, the
Commission, and the legislature.
At the same time, the Attorney General has perhaps
been unduly restrictive in the criteria adopted for early
disposition programs. For instance, the Fast Track Memo
suggests that such programs should be limited to
“exceptional circumstances,”30 although the statute
contains no such limitation. Of course, this and other
criteria are hardly self-defining. (When is declination
“clearly unwarranted”? What does it mean for a class of
cases to be “highly repetitive”?) In practice, the criteria
may be implemented in ways that are more or less
restrictive.
If the criteria are interpreted broadly, authorized early
disposition programs may become commonplace, thus
enhancing localization in federal sentencing. If the
criteria are interpreted narrowly, however, localization
may be suppressed or remain in the shadows. This
would be an unfortunate outcome – another missed
opportunity to bring localization into the guidelines
structure, akin to the Sentencing Commission’s failure
to seize Congress’s invitation to take community views
and circumstances into account in drafting the
guidelines.
C. Accountability
The Feeney Amendment requires greater accountability
of fast-track programs. They have become subject to a
structure created by Congress and the Attorney General.
They must be justified based on general criteria. They are
subject to review by the Attorney General. Cases
disposed of pursuant to a fast-track program must be
reported as such.31 These sorts of reforms lend greater
legitimacy to the fast track.
Yet, from an accountability standpoint, the Fast Track
Memo leaves several crucial matters unaddressed. First,
the procedures specified in the Memo do not provide for
public notice and comment on fast-track proposals.
Second, the procedures permit USAO proposals, but do
not provide for proposals from other stakeholders.
Importantly, while the statutory provisions of the Feeney
Amendment require USAO authorization for fast-track
programs, the statute does not indicate that such
programs must be initiated by a USAO. If others
stakeholders (e.g., judges, public defender organizations,
state and local law enforcement) could initiate proposals,
then USAOs could be drawn into a dialogue about the
appropriateness of fast-track programs for their districts.
As it is, it appears that, if the local USAO declines to
propose a fast-track program (whether for bureaucratic
intransigence or otherwise), other stakeholders and the
public simply have no recourse. Put differently, the Fast
Track Memo imposes new accountability on the decision
to implement a fast-track program, but no accountability
for the decision not to implement such a program.
Third, the Fast Track Memo does not provide for
review of a fast-track program after it is initially
authorized. Thus, a program may seemingly operate
indefinitely after winning approval, even though the
underlying circumstances justifying the program may
change. For instance, a drug-related crime wave in a
district may be an appropriate basis for a fast-track
program for drug defendants, but there is no mechanism
in place that would ensure reconsideration of the
program once the crime wave ends. A regular
reauthorization process (say, once every three years)
would help to ensure that programs continue to be
justified. Public notice and comment opportunities
would further enhance accountability in the
reauthorization process.
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Likewise, the Sentencing Commission has perhaps
diminished the accountability envisioned by Congress in
the way that it has chosen to implement the early
disposition departure. New § 5K3.1 simply instructs the
sentencing court that it “may depart downward not more
than 4 levels” upon motion of the government. The
decision whether to depart, and how much to depart,
seems entirely up to the court, without any particular
standard to guide the district court’s discretion or
subsequent appellate review. May a judge deny a motion
based on the judge’s belief that the resulting sentence
would not be commensurate with the seriousness of the
offense? May a judge override a prosecutor’s
recommendation for, say, a two-level departure and
award the full four levels because the judge believes the
sentence would otherwise be unduly harsh to the
defendant and her family? May a judge deny a motion
because the judge disagrees with the underlying
decision to create a fast-track program? Based simply on
the text of § 5K3.1, the answer to all of these questions is,
at least arguably, yes. Yet, to the extent this
interpretation is correct, § 5K3.1 could become a license
for individual judges to override the policy judgments of
Congress, the Commission, and the Department of
Justice.
The Commission would have done better to specify
that a § 5K3.1 motion should be granted so long as the
defendant has complied with the terms of the district’s
authorized early disposition program. As to calculating
the magnitude of the departure, this should not be
viewed as an opportunity to reopen questions of offense
severity and the like, but, rather, as in inquiry into the
value of the defendant’s cooperation. Because
prosecutors are in the best position to assess the value of
an early disposition, their recommendations should be
given weight, perhaps even a rebuttable presumption of
correctness, but sentencing courts might also be
instructed to consider the § 5K1.1 and § 3E1.1
jurisprudence on substantial assistance and acceptance
of responsibility as establishing benchmarks for how
much to reward cooperation. Additionally, sentencing
courts should be given responsibility for softening
prosecutor-to-prosecutor disparities that may arise in
implementing an early disposition program. If one
prosecutor routinely makes § 5K3.1 motions in cases that
would otherwise generally not receive early disposition
treatment in the district, the judge might consider
awarding only a small benefit (say, a one-level departure).
If another prosecutor routinely recommended only a
small benefit in cases that would otherwise typically
result in more generous recommendations, the judge
might take that fact into account as well.
D. Prosecutorial Power
Rewarding cooperation presents a difficult procedural
dilemma: who should control the distribution of
sentencing benefits. On the one hand, the prosecutor is
in the best position to know the scope and importance of
the defendant’s cooperation. The prosecutor understands
what effort has been expended on the case, and how the
defendant’s behavior has either facilitated or impeded an
efficient resolution. The prosecutor knows the
usefulness of any assistance the defendant has offered
towards the prosecution of other offenders. The
prosecutor knows whether the defendant has been
honest in her dealings with the authorities. All of this
suggests that the prosecutor ought to control how much
of a cooperation benefit the defendant receives at
sentencing. Moreover, to the extent that the prosecutor
bargains for cooperation, the prosecutor will be able to
bargain most effectively if the defendant knows that the
prosecutor will be able to deliver whatever cooperation
benefits are promised.
On the other hand, there are equally persuasive
arguments that the judge ought to control the
distribution of cooperation benefits. Judicial decisions
are subject to important procedural safeguards that do
not apply to prosecutorial decisions: judges make
decisions on the basis of evidence that is subject to
adversarial testing, judges must publicly explain their
decisions, and judges may be reversed by an appellate
court. Prosecutors, in short, are less accountable for their
decisions than judges. Additionally, because prosecutors
are the primary beneficiaries of defendant cooperation,
prosecutors may not be the most trustworthy evaluators
of cooperation. They may tend to value cooperation too
high relative to other purposes of sentencing, such as
ensuring that punishment is proportionate to culpability.
They may also value some forms of cooperation that are
at least arguably contrary to the public interest. For
instance, while a prosecutor might be inclined to reduce
or deny cooperation benefits for the filing of any pretrial
motion, regardless of the merits, a judge might properly
be reluctant to penalize a defendant for making a
colorable constitutional claim.
Before the passage of the Feeney Amendment, the
guidelines divided the authority to reward cooperation
between judges and prosecutors. Prosecutors held (and
still hold) the keys to the substantial assistance departure,
but exercised much less control over the award of
downward adjustments for acceptance of responsibility.
The Feeney Amendment modifies the balance of power
by giving prosecutors, in effect, an essentially
unreviewable veto over the award of the third-level
acceptance reduction. The Feeney Amendment likewise
makes prosecutors the gatekeepers to the new early
disposition departure by conditioning the departure on a
government motion.
This readjustment of power seems an odd move in a
piece of legislation that otherwise seeks to reduce the
discretion and enhance the accountability of front-line
sentencing actors.32 Of particular concern is the absence
of a mechanism to review refusals to make acceptance of
responsibility and early disposition departure motions.
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The lack of such a mechanism invites unwarranted
disparities in implementation, reflecting different
approaches to plea-bargaining by different prosecutors in
different cases. The availability of a prosecutor’s motion
in a given case may turn on any number of
considerations that smack of arbitrariness: the
prosecutor’s relationship with defense counsel; whether
the prosecutor’s attention is absorbed by other cases; the
prosecutor’s desire for trial experience or a reputation for
toughness; race, ethnicity, or sex discrimination
(conscious or otherwise); and so forth. Indeed, past
experience with substantial assistance motions – for
which some correlation has been found with various
personal demographic characteristics, such as sex and
ethnicity33 – suggests that these concerns are more than
merely speculative.
The concerns here may be addressed at two levels.
First, the sentencing judge may correct arbitrary refusals
to make a motion. Indeed, there seems no good reason
why judges should not have at least the same (very
limited) authority in this context that they have to review
improper refusals by prosecutors to offer substantial
assistance motions.34 Still, this sort of review seems
unlikely to provide a systematic check on prosecutorial
arbitrariness: cooperation motions are necessarily
wrapped up in the plea-bargaining process, which courts
have been loathe to intrude upon in light of separation of
powers concerns.
Second, the USAO may adopt policies and procedures
that minimize disparities. For instance, the USAO may
set forth clear, written criteria that establish under what
circumstances a motion will be made. Thus, for an early
disposition program, the USAO might precisely define
what cases are subject to the program, what sort of plea
offer must be tendered to eligible defendants by when,
and how long defendants have to accept or reject the
offer. Assuming all of these conditions are satisfied, the
prosecutor would be obligated to make a § 5K3.1 motion.
Alternatively (or additionally), the USAO might establish
internal review procedures, permitting defendants to
“appeal” refusals to make a cooperation motion and
requiring a written explanation of the disposition of the
appeal.
It is unfortunate that these sorts of considerations
were not addressed in the Fast Track Memo. For
instance, specific internal review procedures might have
been required as a condition of approval for an early
disposition program. Even now, in responding to
proposals, the Attorney General might at least encourage
USAOs to adopt policies and procedures that will allay
concerns about prosecutorial inconsistency. Yet, the
Department of Justice’s historic failure to address
concerns regarding substantial assistance motions leaves
one with little confidence that the new responsibilities of
federal prosecutors will be administered with any more
effective internal controls.
IV. Conclusion
Before the Feeney Amendment was enacted, the
guidelines suffered from a substantial gap in the
cooperation inducement regime, with no clearly
authorized bases for rewarding cooperation going
beyond mere acceptance of responsibility, but not rising
to the level of substantial assistance. In order to fill this
gap, many districts developed fast-track programs that at
least arguably contravened the spirit of the guidelines.
Congress responded appropriately by authorizing the
new early disposition departure. This departure fills an
important gap in the guidelines and offers enhanced
accountability (and hence legitimacy) to fast-track
programs. One might object by arguing that cooperation
should not be part of the sentencing calculus at all, but
cooperation inducements have been part of the
guidelines from the beginning and are otherwise
well-ensconced in the American criminal justice
system.35 The only realistic question is how much of an
inducement for what types of cooperation. If we are
going to have cooperation inducements, we ought to
have a coherent system that makes justifiable
distinctions among defendants on justifiable grounds.
The early disposition departure is a step in the right
direction towards a more coherent system.
The early disposition departure also brings new
flexibility to the guidelines by explicitly authorizing
sentencing variation based on local conditions. Formal
recognition of localization is long overdue in federal
sentencing law. Of course, de facto localization has been
a continuing reality of federal sentencing practice. It is
time for the law to catch up with the practice. A
disconnect between the two has undermined public
confidence in the system, fueling the perception of
lawlessness in sentencing that drove the enactment of
many of the less appealing aspects of the Feeney
Amendment. Much like cooperation inducements,
localization is a fact of life for contemporary criminal
justice; the real challenge with both is to develop a
coherent, structured system that offers both flexibility to
front-line sentencing actors and assurances of
accountability to the public. It is to be hoped that the
early disposition departure will promote a new dialogue
about “structured localization” and ultimately lead to
additional reforms along these lines.
Yet, the promise of the early disposition departure
may be undermined by two other developments. First,
the Attorney General may unduly restrict the availability
of the departure. While it is not yet clear how the criteria
set forth in the Fast Track Memo will be implemented,
the emphasis on “extraordinary circumstances” suggests
that the Attorney General intends to reduce the
prevalence of fast-track programs. If USAOs are
discouraged from developing fast-track proposals, then
the dialogue on structured localization may end up
stunted and ineffective.
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Second, the Feeney Amendment’s emphasis on
prosecutorial control, coupled with the implementation
policy decisions made by the Attorney General and the
Sentencing Commission, may result in as much
confusion and frustration with the new cooperation
regime as with the old. The statute gives an
unreviewable veto to prosecutors over both the early
disposition departure and the third-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. The Commission gave no
guidance to help sentencing judges review the early
disposition recommendations made by prosecutors. The
Attorney General did not provide for robust public
participation in the early departure program. Where
the old cooperation regime could rightly be
criticized for a lack of accountability, the new regime
may suffer much the same weakness, but with
frustration now focused not on the supposedly soft-
hearted federal judges, but on the opaque prosecutorial
bureaucracy.
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